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In September 2002, President George Bush released the much an-
ticipated National Security Strategy of the United States of America
(NSS). It articulates a robust, aggressive, and highly controversial grand
strategy that will serve as the starting point for development of subordi-
nate strategies, such as the National Military Strategy.' Of particular note
is its embrace of a preemptive approach to maintaining security, one de-
signed to remedy the shortfalls of containment and deterrence in a
twenty-first century threat environment characterized by transnational
terrorists and weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Much of the controversy surrounds the advisability of preemption.
Some pundits suggest that highlighting the preemptive option actually
encourages use of weapons of mass destruction, lest they be lost during a
first strike. Others are concerned that U.S. adoption of a preemptive
strategy might legitimize preemption by other States in highly unstable
situations, for instance during the nuclear saber rattling that periodically
infects the Indian subcontinent. Still others worry that preemption
threatens the Westphalian order, with its keystone principles of sover-
eignty and territorial inviolability. After all, effectively preempting
transnational terrorists who operate from scores of countries-some co-
operative, some not-necessarily implies treading upon previously
* Professor of International Law, George C. Marshall European Center for Security
Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. The views expressed herein are those of the au-
thor in his personal capacity and do not necessarily represent those of any U.S. or German
government agency.
1. A nation's "grand strategy" embraces its economic, military, political, and informa-
tional strategies. As of April 1, 2003, the new National Military Strategy had not been
released. On national security strategy, see STRATEGY AND FORCE PLANNING (Richmond M.
Lloyd et al. eds., 3d ed. 2000); U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE GUIDE TO STRATEGY (Joseph R.
Cerami & James F Holcomb, Jr. eds., 2001).
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pristine sovereign rights. Similarly, effectively preventing the develop-
ment and transfer of weapons of mass destruction requires an
intrusiveness that arguably jeopardizes a State-centric world order. Par-
ticularly interesting is the cast of characters who have urged caution
vis-A-vis the probable test case, Iraq. As Republican gray beards like
Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft have warned, preemption will
prove a complicated option when applied to real world events.2
That said, it is not the intent here to enter the fray.3 Rather, this Arti-
cle explores the appropriateness of preemptive strategies in international
law. Are preemptive actions approved by the international community
lawful? Can States act unilaterally or in a coalition of the willing to pre-
empt terrorism, the development and transfer of WMD, or other threats?
If so, under what circumstances and based on what quantum and quality
of evidence? When can preemptive actions be taken against non-State
actors such as terrorists who are based in other States?
Although the new U.S. National Security Strategy makes the issue of
preemption timely, it will be used solely for illustrative purposes. In-
stead, the analysis that follows applies to preemptive actions in general.
Likewise, despite the current brouhaha over the arguably preemptive
2. Henry A. Kissinger, Statement of the Honorable Henry A. Kissinger Before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Sept. 26, 2002) (on file with author); Henry A. Kiss-
inger, Our Intervention in Iraq, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 2002, at AI5; Brent Scowcroft, Don't
Attack Saddam, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2002, at A12.
3. An interesting analysis of possible preemption in the Iraq case is Briefing Memo
No. 25 from Charles Knight, to the Project on Defense Alternatives, First Strike Guidelines:
the Case of Iraq (Sept. 16, 2002). Knight applies criteria (and argues they are not met) devel-
oped by Dr. Barry R. Schneider, Director of the Air Force's Counterproliferation Center. Dr.
Schneider's criteria include:
* Is the enemy undeterrable, violent, and a risktaker?
* Is the enemy on the WMD threshold or beyond it?
* Are vital U.S. interests threatened?
* Are key enemy targets precisely located and vulnerable?
* Is surprise achievable?
* Does the United States have a first strike capability?
* Is the United States homeland safe from enemy WMD?
* Would the United States and its allies be safe from retaliation from the WMD
of third parties?
* Have all non-military options been exhausted before considering preemption?
* Does the United States have clear objectives achievable by appropriate means?
* Is the United States committing enough resources and is it taking all necessary
steps to insure victory?
Barry R. Schneider, Radical Responses to Radical Regimes: Evaluating Preemptive Counter-
Proliferation, McNAIR PAPER 41, at vi (1995). As will be seen, the ninth criterion is an essen-
tial element of a legal analysis of a preemptive strike.
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strike against Iraq, no attempt will be made to comprehensively assess its
legality. Absent an in-depth review of the Iraqi WMD programs, Iraqi
intentions as to its use and transfer, and Iraqi ties to transnational terror-
ist groups, it would be rash to render any purportedly definitive opinion.
On the contrary, this Article simply sets forth generic criteria for use in
assessing the legality of preemptive military operations on a case-by-
case basis.'
I. THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
The first inklings of the new strategy began to appear soon after the
tragic events of September 11.6 In his January 2002 State of the Union
4. Both the U.S. and British governments have released unclassified reports on Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction programs. OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER, IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION: THE ASSESSMENT OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT (2002), available at
http://www.pm.gov.uk/files/pdf/iraqdossier.pdf; DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE,
IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAMS (2002), available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/iraq-wmd/IraqOct_2002.htm. The U.S. report concludes
that:
Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of
UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as
well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it
probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade.
* Baghdad hides large portions of Iraq's WMD efforts ....
* Since inspections ended in 1998, Iraq has maintained its chemical weapons ef-
fort, energized its missile program, and invested more heavily in biological
weapons; most analysts assess Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons pro-
gram ....
* How quickly Iraq will obtain its first nuclear weapon depends on when it ac-
quires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material ....
* Baghdad has begun renewed production of chemical warfare agents, probably
including mustard, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX ....
* All key aspects-[research and development], production, and weaponiza-
tion--of Iraq's offensive BW program are active and most elements are larger
and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War ....
* Iraq maintains a small missile force and several development programs, in-
cluding for a UAV that most analysts believe probably is intended to deliver
biological warfare agents.
5. Guy Roberts has proposed agreement between States on a normative regime that
would legitimize self-help in the face of threats from weapons of mass destruction. Guy B.
Roberts, The Counterproliferation Self-Help Paradigm: A Legal Regime for Enforcing the
Norm Prohibiting the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 27 DENY. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 483 (1999).
6. The Clinton administration implicitly considered the possibility of preemption in its
Defense Counterproliferation Initiative (DCI). Announced by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin
in December 1993, and launched pursuant to Presidential Decision Directive 18, the initiative
focused primarily on the acquisition of new technologies. It did not explicitly articulate a new
Winter 20031
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Address, the president labeled States such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea
an "axis of evil," and pledged, "I will not wait on events. I will not stand
by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will
not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the
world's most destructive weapons."' Clearly, the president was announc-
ing his intent to strike before a hostile regime could develop WMD that
might threaten the United States.
In May, he took this message to Europe. Speaking to the German
Bundestag, the president warned that "[t]he authors of terror are seeking
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Regimes that sponsor terror
are developing these weapons and the missiles to deliver them. If these
regimes and their terrorist allies were to perfect these capabilities, no
inner voice of reason, no hint of conscience would prevent their use. '
The following month, President Bush addressed the graduating class
of the United States Military Academy at West Point. It was this speech
that captured global attention by unambiguously signaling adoption of a
preemptive strategy. As the president explained,
For much of the last century, America's defense relied on the
Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment. In some
cases, those strategies still apply. But new threats also require
new thinking. Deterrence-the promise of massive retaliation
against nations-means nothing against shadowy terrorist net-
works with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not
possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass de-
struction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly
provide them to terrorist allies.
We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the
best. We cannot put our faith in the word of tyrants, who sol-
emnly sign nonproliferation treaties, and then systemically break
them. If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have
waited too long .... Our security will require all Americans to
be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive ac-
strategy. On the DCI, see Thomas G. Mahnken, A Critical Appraisal of the Defense Counter-
proliferation Initiative, NAT'L SECURITY STUD. Q., Summer 1999, at 91.
7. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11 html.
8. President George W. Bush, Remarks to a Special Session of the German Bundestag




tion when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our
lives.9
Note the president's characterization of deterrence and containment
as inadequate in the face of the new threats endangering the United
States. For him, the shifting threat environment necessitated a corre-
sponding strategic shift.
That shift occurred formally with the September issuance of the new
National Security Strategy. Reflecting concerns expressed throughout
the year, the strategic calculations set forth in the document were under-
pinned by anxiety over the development of weapons of mass destruction
by rogue States, the possibility that such weapons might find their way
into the hands of terrorists, and the inability to effectively deter or con-
tain such threats, except by preemptive action. In the president's mind,
today's security environment is proving far more perilous than the Cold
War's:
But new deadly challenges have emerged from rogue states and
terrorists. None of these contemporary threats rival the sheer de-
structive power that was arrayed against us by the Soviet Union.
However, the nature and motivations of these new adversaries,
their determination to obtain destructive powers hitherto avail-
able only to the world's strongest states, and the greater
likelihood that they will use weapons of mass destruction against
us, make today's security environment more complex and dan-
I0
gerous.
As in the West Point address, the National Security Strategy posits
the impotence of traditional strategies in averting these threats. In dec-
ades past, so the argument goes, the United States faced a "status quo,
9. President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise
of the United States Military Academy at West Point (June 1, 2002) (emphasis added),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html . The exist-
ing doctrines retain some strategic relevance. As the president's National Security Advisor
noted in October 2002,
[t]he National Security Strategy does not overturn five decades of doctrine and jetti-
son either containment or deterrence. These strategic concepts can and will
continue to be employed where appropriate. But some threats are so potentially
catastrophic-and can arrive with so little warning, by means that are untraceable-
that they cannot be contained. Extremists who seem to view suicide as a sacrament
are unlikely to ever be deterred.
Condoleezza Rice, Wriston Lecture to the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research (Oct. 1,
2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021001-6.htm.
10. WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 13 (2002) [hereinafter NSS], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
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risk-averse adversary."" While deterrence proved effective in that envi-
ronment, a "deterrence based only upon the threat of retaliation is less
likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks,
gambling with the lives of their people, and the wealth of their nations."'2
An analogous logic applies to terrorists, "whose avowed tactics are wan-
ton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers
seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is stateless-
ness."'3 The 2002 NSS unequivocally offers a solution to this dilemma:
"The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's
threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our
adversaries' choice of weapons, do not permit [relying on a reactive pos-
ture]. We cannot let our enemies strike first."'
4
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW
Perhaps anticipating criticism, the National Security Strategy explic-
itly contends that the preemptive option is firmly grounded in
international law.
For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not
suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend
themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of at-
tack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned
the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent
threat-most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and
air forces preparing to attack.
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities
and objectives of today's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists
do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know
such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terror and,
potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction-weapons
II. Id. at 15.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. (emphasis added). The Secretary of Defense's Annual Report makes the same
point in a "lessons learned" section:
[D]efending the United States requires prevention and sometimes preemption. It is
not possible to defend against every threat, in every place, at every conceivable
time. The only defense against is to take the war to the enemy. The best defense is a
good offense.




that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used with-
out warning. "
In other words, the law of self-defense has long permitted military action
in anticipation of an imminent attack. However, the requirement of im-
minency must evolve as the nature of the threat changes.
After providing the legal justification for preemption, the NSS enun-
ciates the standard by which the United States will act.
The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction-and the
more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to de-
fend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and
place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile
acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act
preemptively. 6
Does this standard comport with international law? Or is it an exam-
ple of the global "hyper-power" contorting international legal standards
to its own purpose? As will become apparent, the answers to such ques-
tions depend on the facts at hand in each individual case.
A. The Prohibition on the Use of Force
By the dawn of the twentieth century, the use of military force by
States was considered a necessary and appropriate, albeit unfortunate,
instrument of international relations. In his classic 1866 work, The Ele-
ments of International Law, Henry Wheaton provided the justification
for this view:
The independent societies of men, called States, acknowledge no
common arbiter or judge, except such as are constituted by spe-
cial compact. The law by which they are governed, or profess to
be governed, is deficient in those positive sanctions which are
annexed to the municipal code of each distinct society. Every
State has therefore a right to resort to force, as the only means of
redress for injuries inflicted upon it by others, in the same man-
ner as individuals would be entitled to that remedy were they not
subject to the laws of civil society. Each State is also entitled to
judge for itself, what are the nature and extent of the injuries
which will justify such a means of redress."
15. NSS, supra note 10, at 15.
16. Id.
17. HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 290 (8th ed. 1866).
winter 20031
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Indeed, manuals of law prepared for military officers during the First
World War embodied this paradigm.'" The unprecedented carnage of that
war led to attempts to restrict the use of force. 9 In the interwar years,
two were particularly noteworthy. The first, the 1919 Covenant of the
League of Nations, did not render war illegal, but did set out various re-
strictions on the right to employ force in disputes between parties to the
treaty. Most notably, article 12 required them to submit disputes to arbi-
tration, judicial settlement, or enquiry by the League's Council.
Disputants were prohibited from resorting to war until three months after
the arbitral award, judicial decision, or report by the Council.2 °
Much more normatively significant was the 1928 adoption of the
Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy
(the Kellogg-Briand Pact).' By article I, the parties to the Pact "con-
demn[ed] recourse to war for the solution of international controversies,
and renounc[ed] it as an instrument of national policy in their relations
with one another." The prohibition was by no means absolute. Various
reservations deposited by States party to the Pact made it plain that self-
defense continued to be a legitimate use of force. Additionally, as treaty
law, the Pact bound neither non-parties nor parties who found them-
selves involved in a dispute with a non-party. Finally, by restricting the
prohibition to the use of force in pursuit of national policy, it remained
legitimate to use force pursuant to international policy, in particular
when authorized by the League of Nations. 3
18. See, e.g., CHARLES H. STOCKTON, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE
USE OF NAVAL OFFICERS 155 (rev. ed. 1917).
19. It was common for States to conclude bilateral agreements renouncing the right to
use force. Several multilateral treaties limited the right of States to go to war. Most notable
were the Hague Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1899 and
of 1907. Article 2 of the Conventions provided, "In case of serious disagreement or conflict,
before an appeal to arms, the Signatory Powers agree to have recourse, as far as circumstances
allow, to the good offices or mediation of one or more friendly Powers." Convention for the
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1779, 1 Bevans 230; Con-
vention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2199, I
Bevans 577.
20. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 12.
21. Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27,
1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
22. As an example, when hostilities flared in 1929 between China and the Soviet Un-
ion, the United States sent both sides a diplomatic note reminding them of their obligations
under the Pact. DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 274 (John W. Wheeler-Bennett ed.,
1929). The USSR replied that it was acting pursuant to its right of self-defense and was there-
fore not in breach. Id. at 279.
23. Both Professors Ian Brownlie and Yoram Dinstein have made this point in their
seminal works on the jus ad bellun. IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF




The Kellogg-Briand Pact did affect State practice in the interwar
years. For instance, it provided the legal basis for multiple bilateral and
multilateral nonaggression pacts.4 It was also regularly referenced when
hostilities flared, such as those between China and the USSR, China and
Japan, Peru and Colombia, and Italy and Ethiopia. Indeed, the Pact's
prohibition on the use of force formed the legal basis for the offense of
crimes against peace contained in the Charters of the International Mili-
tary Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo.25
What the Kellogg-Briand Pact did not do was supply an enforcement
mechanism. That omission would be remedied with the next noteworthy
attempt to prohibit resort to military force, the United Nations Charter.
Drafted in 1945, the Charter imposed a near absolute prohibition on the
use of force. Article 2(4) provides that "All Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."26 Several
aspects of the prohibition merit comment.
Although the obligation to refrain from using force applies only to
Members, it extends to acts of force against any State, even a non-party.
In the twenty-first century, this is a point of de minimus import for two
reasons. First, although only 51 States were party to the Charter in 1945,
today membership stands at 191, virtually the entire world. Second, the
prohibition has become, as will be discussed, customary international
law, thereby binding all States, present and future.
The language of article 2(4) might also seem to imply that the only
prohibited uses of force are those directed against the territorial integrity
or political independence of a State. Thus, for example, a preemptive
surgical strike against a weapons manufacturing facility in which there
24. Violation of a number of these agreements provided a basis for charges at the Nur-
emberg Trials: Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation Between Germany and Luxemburg,
Sept. 11, 1929, F.R.G.-Lux., 118 L.N.T.S. 104; Polish-German Declaration, Jan. 26, 1934,
Pol.-F.R.G., in POLAND'S INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 166 (Stephan Horak ed., 1964); Treaty of
Non-Aggression Between German Reich and the Kingdom of Denmark, May 31, 1939,
ER.G.-Den., 197 L.N.T.S. 40; Treaty of Non-Aggression Between Germany and U.S.S.R.,
Aug. 23, 1939, ER.G.-U.S.S.R., in I DOCUMENTS ON INT'L AFF. 408 (1939).
25. See, e.g., International Military Tribunal, Indictment, app. C, Charges and Particu-
lars of Violations of International Treaties, Agreements and Assurances Caused by the
Defendants in the Course of Planning, Preparing, and Initiating the Wars, Charge XIII, "Viola-
tion of Treaty between Germany and other Powers providing for Renunciation of War as an
Instrument of National Policy, signed at Paris 27 August 1928, known as the Kellogg-Briand
Pact," available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/countc.htm. Violations were
charged as to German actions against Poland, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, Greece, the USSR, and the United States.
26. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
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was no intent to seize territory or affect political processes would not
implicate the prohibition.27
This interpretation neglects the article's prohibition of the use of
force "in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations." Among those purposes is the maintenance of "international
peace and security."28 Since 1945, the Security Council, as will be dis-
cussed, has freely characterized situations as threatening international
peace and security. In light of this liberality, it would be incongruent to
narrowly construe the scope of uses of force forbidden by article 2(4).
Moreover, the Charter's travaux preparatoires reveal that inclusion of
the territorial integrity and political independence verbiage occurred dur-
ing the San Francisco Conference at the behest of several smaller States
that merely wanted to stress those conditions; at no time were they in-
tended as limitations on the use of force prohibition.29
Of greater consequence when assessing preemptive strategies is the
prohibition on threats to use force. The years preceding the Second
World War witnessed numerous such threats that contributed to the out-
break of global conflagration. ° Accordingly, the Charter drafters
included threats in the article 2(4) proscription.
It is essential to understand that the prohibition only extends to situa-
tions where the threatened use of force would itself be illegal. In the
context of preemptive strategies, this is of particular importance. Such
strategies may well entail threats to use force if the other side does not
desist from a particular course of conduct. Their lawfulness depends on
whether it would be appropriate to employ force in the extant circum-
stances at the time the threatened force would be used. As the
International Court of Justice stated in its 1996 advisory opinion, Legal-
ity of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, "if it is to be lawful, the
declared readiness of a State to use force must be a use of force that is in
conformity with the Charter."3
Consider the repeated U.S. threats to use military force to put an end
to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program, without Security Council
sanction if necessary, made prior to its attack on March 19, 2003. The
27. Professor Anthony D'Amato has asked precisely these questions in the context of
the 1981 Israeli air strike against an Iraqi nuclear installation near Baghdad. ANTHONY
D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT 57-73 (1987); see also Anthony
D'Amato, Israel's Air Strike Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 584 (1983).
28. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. I.
29. See Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NA-
TIONS: A COMMENTARY 112, paras. 37-39 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter
CHARTER COMMENTARY].
30. See, for example, Polish and Hungarian threats against Czechoslovakia in 1938.
31. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion), 1996 I.C.J.
225, para. 47 (July 8).
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question is not the legality of Iraqi WMD production and possession.
True, such actions may be wrongful under international law, thereby
constituting a breach of State responsibility. However, the remedies for
an international wrong traditionally include restitution, compensation, or
satisfaction, not resort to armed force.32 This point is emphasized in arti-
cle 50 of the International Law Commission's Articles on State
Responsibility. There, it is specifically provided that "[c]ountermeasures
shall not affect ... the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of
force as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations."33 The restriction
also tracks the International Court of Justice's landmark 1949 judgment
in Corfu Channel.4
Instead, the appropriate query is whether or not the United States
was justified in using force against Iraq pursuant to an exception to the
article 2(4) prohibition at the time the threats were made. The Charter
allows for three, two of which are relevant: authorization by the Security
Council under Chapter VII, and individual or collective self-defense pur-
suant to article 51.
35
32. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 211-34 (2002). Established by
the U.N. General Assembly in 1947, the International Law Commission is composed of thirty-
four distinguished international lawyers elected by the General Assembly for five year terms.
Most of their efforts are devoted to preparing draft documents on international law. Topics can
be selected by the Commission itself, or by the General Assembly or the Economic and Social
Council. When draft articles are complete, the General Assembly usually convenes an interna-
tional conference to incorporate the draft articles into a convention. The Commission adopted
the Draft Articles on State Responsibility in 2001. Pursuant to those articles, restitution rees-
tablishes "the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed" (art. 35), Draft
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess.,
Agenda Item 162, at 8, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (2002); compensation covers any financially
assessable damage not made good by restitution (art. 36), id.; satisfaction is "an acknowl-
edgement of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology or another appropriate
modality" that responds to shortfalls in restitution and compensation when making good the
injury caused (art. 37), id. at 9. In very limited circumstances, countermeasures involving
force can be permissible. Sending agents into a State to apprehend a terrorist that State wrong-
fully refused to extradite would be one example. Mary Ellen O'Connell, Lawful Responses to
Terrorism, JURIST (2001), at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forun/forumnew30.htm.
33. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 32, at 12.
34. Corfu Channel Case (Merits), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9). The Court held that every
State has an "obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the
rights of other States." Id. The case involved an incident in which two British destroyers struck
mines in Albanian waters while transiting the Corfu Strait in 1946. Though the evidence was
insufficient to demonstrate that the Albanians laid the mines, the Court nevertheless held that
they had the obligation to notify shipping of the danger posed by the mines. Albania's failure
to do so represented an internationally wrongful act entailing the international responsibility
of Albania. But the Court also held that Albania's failure to comply with its responsibility did
not justify the British minesweeping of the Strait, an act that therefore constituted a violation
of Albanian sovereignty.
35. The Charter also authorized action against former "enemy States" of World War II
under certain circumstances. U.N. CHARTER arts. 53, 107.
Winter 20031
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Before turning to those exceptions, it might finally be asked whether
there exists in customary international law an analogous prohibition on
the use of force. Customary law is unique in that it binds all States; in
that sense, it differs from treaty-based law, which sets forth rights and
obligations only for Party-States.36 A practice of States matures into cus-
tomary law when that practice evidences opinio juris sive necessitatis, a
belief on the part of States engaging in it that the practice is legally• 37
obligatory.
Although it might be suggested that the scores of armed conflicts
since 1945 augur against maturation of the prohibition into customary
international law, in its 1986 judgment in the Nicaragua case, the Inter-
national Court of Justice found that it had done exactly that. Referring to
State attitudes toward various General Assembly Resolutions referencing
the prohibition, the Court stated that they
cannot be understood as merely that of a 'reiteration or elucida-
tion' of the treaty commitment undertaken in the Charter. On the
contrary, it may be understood as an acceptance of the validity
of the rule or set of rules declared by the resolution by them-
selves. The principle of non-use of force ... may thus be
regarded as a principle of customary international law.38
36. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a "treaty does not
create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent." Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 34, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 341, 8 I.L.M. 679, 694.
37. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice is universally accepted
as a restatement of the sources of international law. Paragraph l(b) includes "international
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted by law" in such sources. The duration and
extent of the requisite practice is a matter of some controversy. Statute of the International
Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, para. 1, 59 Stat. 1031, 1043, 1978 Y.B.U.N. 1185,
1197. On customary international law, see also V.D. DEGAN, SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 142-78 (1997); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 102 (1986). On the issue of the customary international law regarding the
use of force, see generally MARK WEISBURD, USE OF FORCE: THE PRACTICE OF STATES SINCE
WORLD WAR II(1997).
38. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) (Mer-
its), 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 188 (June 27)(merits). In particular, the Court cited the Declaration
on Friendly Relations. It provides that,
[elvery State has a duty to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Such a
threat or use of force constitutes a violation of international law and the Charter of
the United Nations and shall never be employed as a means of settling international
issues.
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Coopera-
tion Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625,
U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Agenda Item 85, at 7, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970).
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The International Law Commission's 1966 Commentary to the Final
Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties went further still. In it, the Com-
mission opined, in a statement later referred to in the Nicaragua
judgment, "that the law of the Charter concerning the prohibition of the
use of force in itself constitutes a conspicuous example of a rule in inter-
national law having the character of jus cogens. 3 9 Such peremptory
norms cannot be derogated from, even by treaty, and thus represent the
most powerful genre of international law.
Clearly then, the prohibition on the use of force, an obligation based
not only in treaty and customary law, but also a peremptory norm, repre-
sents a stringent restriction on the preemptive employment of military
force. The legality of such use will, therefore, depend on the applicabil-
ity of exceptions to the prohibition.
B. Uses of Force Authorized by the Security Council
The mere fact that a State has violated article 2(4)'s prohibition on
the threat or use of force does not allow the State against whom the force
is employed to reply in kind. On the contrary, a response must be consis-
tent with either of the two exceptions found within the Charter.
Authorization by the Security Council is the first. The Charter's pro-
cedure for granting that authority is relatively straightforward. Pursuant
to article 39 of Chapter VII, the Security Council must first "determine
the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression." Once that has occurred, the Council may either make rec-
ommendations to those involved or "decide what measures shall be taken
... to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Under article 41, the Security Council should first consider calling
on U.N. Members to apply "measures not involving the use of armed
force." Such measures include, inter alia, "complete or partial interrup-
tion of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio,
and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic re-
lations. 4' However, if nonforceful measures have been tried
unsuccessfully, or if the Council determines that it would be fruitless to
attempt them, under article 42 it may then "take such action by air, sea,
or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international
peace and security." In other words, the Council may authorize the use of
force.
39. SIR ARTHUR WATTS, 2 THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION: 1949-1998, at 741
(1999). The statement was made in the official ILC Commentary to article 50.
40. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. For an excellent discussion of article 39, see Jochen
Frowein, Article 39, in CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 29, at 717.
41. U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
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Several aspects of this process merit comment. First, note that there
need not have been an actual breach of the peace or act of aggression.
The fact that the formula includes threats to the peace makes it indisput-
able that the Council may authorize preemptive military action. This is
equally apparent from the inclusion of maintenance of international
peace and security in the permissible purposes of the enforcement ac-
tion. The very fact that there is even a discussion about whether Security
Council authorization was required prior to strikes against Iraq presumes
the possibility of that body authorizing preemptive military steps.
Moreover, action can be ordered in response to any threat to the
peace, so long as the intention is to maintain or restore international
peace and security. This represents a broad grant of discretion. Between
January and November 2002, the Security Council formally found a
situation to threaten peace on ten separate occasions . For instance, in
October 2002 the Council labeled the hostage taking at the Moscow
theatre such a threat. 3 In the case of Iraq, Security Council Resolution
1441, the resolution demanding Iraqi compliance with the weapons in-
spection program and warning Iraq that "it will face serious
consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations,"
specifically branded "Iraq's non-compliance with Council resolutions
and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range mis-
siles" as a threat to international peace and security." These express
findings of a threat are in addition to the numerous times the Council
either reaffirmed pre-2002 resolutions that labeled a state of affairs a
threat or addressed the issue peripherally, as it did, for example, by ex-
pressing "grave concern" over Israeli reoccupation of Arafat's
headquarters in September 2002 As an illustration of the Council's dis-
cretionary power in this regard, it has even gone as far as characterizing
Libya's failure to cooperate in the prosecution of the Pan Am Flight 103
42. S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4644th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441
(2002) (Iraq); S.C. Res. 1440, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4632d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1440
(2002) (Moscow); S.C. Res. 1438, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4624th mtg., U.N. Doc.
SIRES/1438 (2002) (Bali); S.C. Res. 1417, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4554th mtg., U.N. Doe.
S/RES/1417 (2002) (Congo); S.C. Res. 1413, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4541st mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1413 (2002) (Afghanistan); S.C. Res. 1408, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4526th mtg., U.N.
Doc. SJRES/1408 (2002) (support by Liberia to rebel groups); S.C. Res. 1404, U.N. SCOR,
57th Sess., 4514th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/1404 (2002) (Angola); S.C. Res. 1400, U.N.
SCOR, 57th Sess., 4500th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/1400 (2002) (Sierra Leone); S.C. Res.
1399, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4495th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/1399 (2002) (Congo); S.C. Res.
1390, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4452nd mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/1390 (2002) (Afghanistan).
43. S.C. Res. 1440, supra note 42. It did exactly the same with regard to the October
12, 2002 bombing in Bali. S.C. Res. 1438, supra note 42.
44. S.C. Res. 1441, supra note 42, at 1, 5.




bombers as a threat to peace.46 Ultimately, it would seem that a threat to
international peace and security is whatever the Council declares it to be.
In light of this leeway, the question of whom the Security Council
may empower to take military action arises.4 ' There are three possibili-
ties. First, the Council may grant a mandate to a coalition of the willing.
As an example, recall Resolution 1386, which authorized the creation of
an Interim Security Assistance Force for Afghanistan in December 2001.
In it, the Council welcomed the United Kingdom's offer to organize and
command the force and called upon U.N. Member States to "contribute
,,41
personnel, equipment and other resources.
Alternatively, the Security Council may turn to another international
organization to provide forces. For instance, in the aftermath of Opera-
tion Allied Force, the NATO air operation against the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, the Council authorized "Member States and relevant in-
ternational organizations to establish the international security presence
in Kosovo" pursuant to Chapter VII.49 The purpose in referring to "inter-
national organizations" was to empower NATO to deploy forces and
exercise command and control over the operation. However, because the
Council did not wish to limit the security presence in Kosovo to NATO
troops, it also authorized individual Member States to participate; the
most notable example was, of course, Russia.
46. S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3063d mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748
(1992). Until the Cold War ended, the Council, due to the existence of off-setting bloc vetoes,
was generally impotent in responding to threats to the peace. Only once did it find a threat to
the peace. That occasion involved the authorization of forceful measures in response to the
situation in Rhodesia. In Security Council Resolution 221 (April 9, 1966), the Council author-
ized the United Kingdom to deny, by force if necessary, access to the Port of Beira in
Mozambique to ships carrying oil destined for Rhodesia. S.C. Res. 221, U.N. SCOR, 21st
Sess., 1276th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/221 (1966). The impotence of the Security Council led
the General Assembly to adopt the Uniting for Peace Resolution in 1950. It provides that, "if
the Security Council, because of the lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to
exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in
any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggres-
sion, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making
appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including . . . the use of
armed force." Uniting for Peace, G.A. Res. 377, 5th Sess., 1, U.N. Doc. A/1481 (1950).
47. There is an interesting legal debate on the basis for such an authorization. Some
scholars suggest that article 42 provides that basis, as it is the provision dealing directly with
the use of force. Others suggest it is article 39, because States never executed agreements with
the Security Council regarding the provision of troops necessary to implement article 42
measures, as is required by article 43. See generally DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 263-73.
Regardless of the legal basis, State and Security Council practice demonstrates that Chapter
VII writ large is deemed to allow the Security Council to mandate military operations.
48. S.C. Res. 1386, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4443d mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/t386
(2001).
49. S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 401 Ith mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244
(1999).
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Finally, under Chapter VII the Security Council may create a "U.N.
force." For instance, in 1999 the Security Council authorized the creation
of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). Initially
authorized to field a force of six thousand troops, by 2002 the authoriza-
tion had grown to nearly twenty thousand .
In summary, the Security Council may clearly sanction preemptive
actions pursuant to its Chapter VII powers. Indeed, the Council enjoys
broad discretion in both determining what situations constitute a threat to
the peace and deciding whom to grant a mandate to in its effort to main-
tain international peace and security.
C. Self-Defense
The second exception to the general prohibition on the use of force
is self-defense. Article 51 of the Charter sets forth the standard. It pro-
vides:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise
of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority
and responsibility of the Security Council under the present
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in
order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Self-defense is, as discussed, the legal basis on which President Bush has
centered his preemption doctrine. Specifically, the NSS envisages con-
ducting operations anticipatorily, even when "uncertainty remains as to
the time and place of the enemy's attack."5'
Tracking this approach, the Congressional Joint Resolution authoriz-
ing the president to commit U.S. troops to battle against Iraq relied on
self-defense (and enforcement of U.N. Security Council resolutions) as
50. The operation was initially authorized pursuant to S.C. Res. 1270, U.N. SCOR,
54th Sess., 4054th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/1270 (1999). Subsequent revisions of the mandate
and operation occurred with S.C. Res. 1289, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4099th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1289 (2000); S.C. Res. 1346, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4306th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1346 (2001); and S.C. Res. 1436, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4615th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1436 (2002). In September 2002, UNAMSIL's mandate was extended to March 2003.
For a description of UNAMSIL, see http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/unamsill
body-unamsil.htm.
51. NSS, supra note 10, at 15.
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its justification under international law. In preambular language, the
resolution described the situation warranting the use of force.
Whereas Iraq's demonstrated capability and willingness to use
weapons of mass destruction, the high risk that the current Iraqi
regime will either employ those weapons to launch a surprise at-
tack against the United States or its Armed Forces or provide
them to international terrorists who would do so, and the ex-
treme magnitude of harm that would result to the United States
and its citizens from such an attack, combine to justify action by
the United States to defend itself .....
The resolution's actual grant of authority not only cited self-defense,
but also noted that the president's authority is based on the existence of a
threat when it authorized him to "use the Armed Forces of the United
States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to ...
defend the national security of the United States against the continuing
threat posed by Iraq; and ... enforce all relevant United Nations Security
Council resolutions regarding Iraq."53 In other words, Congress author-
ized President Bush to act preemptively in response to the possibility that
Iraq would attack the United States or U.S. armed forces, or conspire
with terrorists to do the same. This authorization was entirely consistent
with the 2002 National Security Strategy.
1. The Criteria for Lawful Self-Defense
International law requires that any use Of armed force in self-
defense, preemptive or otherwise, comply with three basic criteria
-- necessity, proportionality, and imminency. These requirements derive
historically from the Caroline case, which involved the nineteenth cen-
tury Mackenzie Rebellion in Canada against the British Crown. Some of
the rebels operated from U.S. soil. Despite diplomatic entreaties by the
British, the United States failed to put an end to use of its territory as a
rebel sanctuary and base of operations. Therefore, in 1837 British forces
mounted a small raid of approximately eighty men across the border into
New York state where they seized the Caroline, a vessel used by the re-
bels and their supporters. They then set the ship on fire and sent it over
Niagara Falls.54
The United States protested the attack on the basis that the British
had violated its sovereignty. When the Foreign Office replied that the
52. Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498, 1499 (2002).
53. Id. at 1501.
54. The case is described in R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J.
INT'L L. 82, 82-92 (1938).
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action had been an appropriate exercise of self-defense, Secretary of
State Daniel Webster argued that for self-defense to be legitimate, the
British had to demonstrate a "necessity of self-defence, instant, over-
whelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation"
and the acts could not be "unreasonable or excessive 55 Over time, this
standard, and its implicit criteria, has become universally accepted as the
keystone in the law of self-defense. The Nuremberg Tribunal spoke ap-
provingly of it,56 as has the International Court of Justice in both its
Nicaragua judgment57 and the Use of Nuclear Weapons advisory opin-
ion.58
The principle of necessity requires that all reasonable alternatives to
the use of force be exhausted. In the context of an ongoing attack, the
absence of options is generally manifest. However, situations that
prompt a preemptive defensive operation are likely to be much less
clear-cut. For instance, what degree of certainty is there that the "threat"
will mature into an attack? Given that a use of force is the most severe
form of sanction available in interstate relations, and in light of the pre-
sumption, albeit rebuttable, against its legitimacy, the likelihood of the
threat being carried out must be exceptionally high before preemptive
55. Letter from Daniel Webster, Secretary of State of the United States, to Henry S.
Fox, Esq., Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Her Britannic Majesty (Apr.
24, 1841), reprinted in 29 BRIT. & FOREIGN ST. PAPERS 1129, 1138 (1857).
56. See International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences (Oct. 1,
1946), reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 205 (1947). There is significant State practice
regarding assertions of anticipatory self-defense. Professor Bowett has noted a number of the
earlier examples:
Pakistan justified the entry of her troops into Kashmir in 1948 on this basis before
the Security Council, an argument opposed only by India. Israel's invasion of Sinai
in October, 1956, and June, 1967, rested on the same argument. The O.A.S. has
used the same argument in relation to the blockade of Cuba during the 1962 missile
crisis. Several states have expressed the same argument in the Sixth Committee in
connection with the definition of aggression and the U.N. itself invoked the princi-
ple of anticipatory self-defense to justify action by O.N.U.C. in Katanga in
December, 1961, and December, 1963. Following the invasion of Czechoslovakia
by the U.S.S.R. in 1968, it is permissible to assume that the U.S.S.R. now shares
this view, for there certainly existed no "armed attack."
Derek W. Bowett, Reprisals Involving Resort to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 4 n.8
(1972).
57. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) (Mer-
its), 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 176 (June 27).
58. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion), 1996 I.C.J.
225, para. 41 (July 8); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 905. Professor Brownlie labels proportionality "the essence of self-
defence." BROWNLIE, supra note 23, at 279 n.2. It is important to note that the Court found
that, "This dual condition applies equally to Article 51 of the Charter," thereby characterizing
the proportionality principle as both customary and conventional law. Use of Nuclear Weap-
ons, 1996 I.C.J. at para. 41.
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action is appropriate. If a situation merely threatens peace, then the cor-
rect remedy is referral to the Security Council (or other nonforceful
option, such as diplomatic or economic sanctions). It is only when a
threatened action is nearly certain to materialize and, as discussed below,
sufficiently imminent, that individual or collective defensive action out-
side the Security Council framework is permissible.
Similarly, and for the same reasons, an extremely high threshold for
determining that no viable option to the use of force exists must apply.59
Yoram Dinstein has suggested, in a slightly different context, a "beyond
reasonable doubt" standard for determining when nonforceful remedies
have been exhausted.' Surely, it cannot be otherwise, for any lesser
standard would amount to permitting speculative defensive attacks. In-
ternational law should not be interpreted as countenancing violation of
its seminal norm, the prohibition on the use of force, when reasonable
doubt as to the facts exists. Thus, if diplomatic, economic, informational,
judicial, or other courses of action might deter the threatened action,
defensive use of force by the target of the threat would violate article
2(4). It is in this context that Chapter VII action relates to the law of self-
defense. If a State wishes to act preemptively, then it must be certain be-
yond reasonable doubt that either the Security Council will fail to act or
that any action it might take will be unsuccessful in deterring the threat.
Operation Allied Force, although conducted pursuant to an asserted
right of humanitarian intervention, illustrates this principle. It was be-
yond reasonable doubt, according to supporters of the intervention, that
the Russian Federation would have vetoed any Security Council resolu-
tion authorizing force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Since
a separate legal basis purportedly existed for action (humanitarian
59. Condoleezza Rice made exactly this point in commenting on the new NSS:
But this approach must be treated with great caution. The number of cases in which
it might be justified will always be small. It does not give a green light-to the
United States or any other nation-to act first without exhausting other means, in-
cluding diplomacy. Preemptive action does not come at the beginning of a long
chain of effort. The threat must be very grave. And the risks of waiting must far
outweigh the risks of action.
Rice, supra note 9.
60. DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 220. Professor Dinstein was addressing a situation in
which terrorists or an armed band had already conducted an attack and there was fear of fol-
low-up attacks. He notes, "[t]he absence of alternative means for putting an end to the
operations of the armed bands or terrorists has to be demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt."
Id.
61. When an attack is underway, the mere fact that the Security Council could consider
the situation does not deprive a State of its right to act in self-defense-recall that by the terms
of article 51, "[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense. . . until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (emphasis added).
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ntervention on behalf of the Kosovar Albanians), and because resort to
the Council would have merely wasted valuable time, the attack was legal.
Applying this approach by analogy to the Iraq case, if it had been
beyond reasonable doubt that the Security Council would be unable to
agree on steps (weapons inspections) to resolve the situation or that the
inspection would be unsuccessful (the argument asserted by many), then
taking military action against Iraq would have been permissible despite
the fact that the Security Council was seized of the matter. In other
words, the mere fact that the Security Council is empowered to consider
situations that threaten the peace--indeed, even the fact that it is consid-
ering the situation--does not deprive a State of its right to self-defense.
Of course, any preemptive defensive actions must comport with other
facets of the principle of necessity (as well as proportionality and immi-
nency).
The principle of proportionality limits any defensive action to that
necessary to defeat an ongoing attack or to deter or preempt a future at-
tack. This simple principle is frequently misstated. The most common
error is suggesting that the size and scope of the defensive action may
not exceed that of the attack. Such a standard could deprive a State of an
ability to effectively defend itself, for it may be necessary to employ
much more force than that which is threatened. Consider Operation En-
during Freedom. Although the consequences of the 9/11 attack- were
horrendous, with thousands of deaths and financial losses measured in
the tens of billions of dollars, the U.S. and coalition response resulted in
conquest of an entire nation. However, although the operation might be
questioned on other grounds,62 there is no doubt that to effectively com-
bat al-Qa'ida, it was necessary to deny Afghanistan as a sanctuary for the
organization. Similarly, little doubt exists that as long as Saddam Hus-
sein ruled Iraq, the country would continue to threaten international
peace and security. Thus, if the country posed a threat severe enough to
legally justify taking military action in self-defense, it was arguably
necessary to remove Saddam from power to ensure the threat's complete
eradication. After all, Iraqi forces were decisively defeated in the 1991
Gulf War. Yet, in the aftermath of that defeat, and despite a robust U.N.
weapons inspection program, Saddam Hussein's Iraq continued to sur-
reptitiously develop weapons of mass destruction.
On the other hand, less force than that which a State is facing may
be all that is needed. Recall the 1981 Israeli air strikes on the Iraqi nu-
clear reactor near Baghdad. Although one might question whether the
attack met the other criteria of self-defense, it was surely proportional.




The Israeli Air Force skillfully conducted the operation, discriminately
targeting the source of a major threat to Israel and violating Iraqi air-
space with only a handful of aircraft for a very short period. Although
the size and scope of the mission paled beside the threat to Israel from
Iraqi nuclear attack, only a limited operation was legally permissible due
to Israel's ability to surgically exterminate the threat.
Finally, the response (or preemption) in self-defense need not be tar-
geted against the attacking forces. Rather, it may be more effective to hit
assets that will exert greater influence on the attacker's cost-benefit cal-
culations. This may involve striking targets that are not directly involved
in the attack, but are of high value to the attacker. Of course, every target
chosen must be a legitimate military objective under the law of armed
conflict.
The point is that the nature of an action in self-defense is not gov-
erned by the nature of the original attack (or in the case of preemptive
self-defense, by the forthcoming attack). Considerations such as the
scale, scope, consequences, and targets of the first blow are irrelevant
when assessing compliance with the principle of proportionality. Instead,
compliance is judged solely against the force necessary to defeat or pre-
empt the underlying strike that justifies the right to self-defense.
The third criterion is imminency, sometimes labeled immediacy.63
Recall the "instant" and "leaving no moment for deliberation" verbiage
in Webster's formula. Some commentators argue for a high standard for
imminence, reading the Caroline principle narrowly.64 Indeed, on its
face, it appears to impose a fairly restrictive test in which the defensive
force can only be used just as the attack is about to be launched.
63. This principle was articulated by Hugo Grotius in 1625:
War in defence of life is permissible only when the danger is immediate and cer-
tain, not when it is merely assumed.
The danger, again, must be immediate and imminent in point of time ....
Further, if a man is not planning an immediate attack, but it has been ascertained
that he has formed a plot, or is preparing an ambuscade, or that he is putting poison
in our way, or that he is making ready a false accusation and false evidence, and is
corrupting the judicial procedure, I maintain that he cannot lawfully be killed, either
if the danger can in any other way be avoided, or if it is not altogether certain that
the danger cannot be otherwise avoided. Generally, in fact, the delay that will inter-
vene affords opportunity to apply many remedies, to take advantage of many
accidental occurrences. ...
HUGo GROTIus, 2 DE JURE BELLI AC PACIs LIBRI TRES 173-75 (Carnegie Endowment trans.
1925)(1625).
64. See, e.g., Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L.
REV. 1620, 1634-35 (1984).
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While a restrictive construction may have made sense in the nine-
teenth century, the nature of warfare has evolved dramatically since then.
The Bush administration cites this evolution as justifying its preemptive
strategy.6" In the twenty-first century, the means of warfare are such that
defeat, or at least a devastating blow, can occur almost instantaneously;
battlespaces have become four-dimensional, with effects measured in
fractions of a second. Moreover, with the advent of transnational terror-
ism, the enemy-including his intentions, location, tactics, and
targets-is proving highly elusive. Whereas the conventional battlefield
has become ever more transparent to those who possess state-of-the-art
surveillance, reconnaissance, and other information warfare technology,
paradoxically the Clausewitzian fog of war has thickened dramatically in
the context of the new war against terrorism. At the same time, weapons
of mass destruction render any miscalculation disastrous.
In such an environment, restrictive approaches to imminency run
counter to the purposes animating the right of self-defense. Its primary
function is to afford States a self-help mechanism by which they may
repel attackers; self-defense recognizes that the international community
may not respond quickly enough, if at all, to an armed attack against a
State. Yet, the imminency component of the principle simultaneously
seeks to stave off violence so as to allow maximum opportunity for
peaceful alternatives to work. In other words, a balance between the
State's right to exist unharmed and the international community's need
to minimize potentially destabilizing uses of force underlies the right of
self-defense.
This being so, maturation of the right to self-defense is relative. For
instance, as defensive options narrow or become less likely to succeed
with the passage of time, the acceptability of preemptive action grows.
Weak States may lawfully act sooner than strong ones in the face of
identical threats because they are at greater risk as time passes. In the
same vein, it may be necessary to conduct defensive operations against a
terrorist group long before a planned attack because there is unlikely to
be another opportunity to target the terrorists before they strike. Other
appropriate considerations include the attacker's timeline and the ability
of the target State to counter a particular type of attack. In other words,
each situation presents a case-specific window of opportunity within
which a State can foil an impending attack. Depending on the circum-
65. For instance, Condoleezza Rice has argued that, "new technology requires new
thinking about when a threat actually becomes 'imminent.' So as a matter of common sense,
the United States must be prepared to take action, when necessary, before threats have fully
materialized." Rice, supra note 9.
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stances, the window may extend for some time, perhaps even to the mo-
ment of attack, or be very limited.66
To summarize, it would be absurd to suggest that international law
requires a State to "take the first hit" when it could effectively defend
itself by acting preemptively.67 This being so, the correct standard for
evaluating a preemptive operation must be whether or not it occurred
during the last possible window of opportunity in the face of an attack
that was almost certainly going to occur. Restated, it is appropriate and
legal to employ force preemptively when the potential victim must im-
mediately act to defend itself in a meaningful way and the potential
aggressor has irrevocably committed itself to attack. This standard com-
bines an exhaustion of remedies component with a requirement for a
very high reasonable expectation of future attacks-an expectation that
is much more than merely speculative.
As a final note on the issue of imminency, it is important not to con-
fuse a preemptive strike in self-defense with self-defense against an
ongoing campaign. Conventional military campaigns seldom occur as
either a single blow or an extended period of uninterrupted combat. On
the contrary, pauses are the norm, not the exception, in conflict. The
same applies to terrorism. For instance, the 9/11 attacks were only the
latest attacks in a long-term terrorist campaign against the United States
by al-Qa'ida. There is evidence of ties between the group and the 1993
World Trade Center bombing, the 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in
66. On the contextual nature of the right to self-defense, see Michael N. Schmitt, Com-
puter Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative
Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 885, 930-32 (1999). Three and a half centuries ago,
de Vattel took precisely the same approach in his classic work, The Law of Nations.
Since it is the lot of men to be guided in most cases by probabilities, these
probabilities deserve their attention in proportion to the importance of the subject-
matter; and, if I may borrow a geometrical expression, one is justified in
forestalling a danger in direct ratio to the degree of probability attending it, and to
the seriousness of the evil with which one is threatened. If the evil in question be
endurable, if the loss be of small account, prompt action need not be taken; there is
no great danger in delaying measures of self-protection until we are certain that
there is actual danger of evil. But suppose the safety of the State is endangered; our
foresight cannot extend too far. Are we to delay averting our destruction until it has
become inevitable?
E. DE VATTEL, 3 THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 249 (Carnegie
Institution trans. 1916)(1758).
67. Article 2 of the Definition of Aggression Resolution refers to the first use of force as
prima facie evidence of aggression. In other words, the burden is upon the actor to demon-
strate that its use of force was not aggression. But this necessarily means that there are first uses
of force that do not amount to aggression and are, therefore, not wrongful. Definition of Aggres-
sion, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 29th Sess., 2319th plen. mtg., Annex, Agenda
Item 86, art. 2, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 710, 713 (1974).
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East Africa,68 and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole. More concretely, al-
Qa'ida claimed responsibility for the 1993 attack against U.S. special
forces in Somalia and multiple bombings in Yemen that were designed to
kill U.S. military personnel. Other unexecuted plots which al-Qa'ida has
masterminded include an attack on tourists in Jordan for the millennium,
blowing up multiple airliners, and assassinating both the Pope and Presi-
dent Clinton .
Once the first attack in an ongoing campaign has been launched, the
issue of preemptive self-defense becomes moot. Imminence is irrelevant
because an armed attack is already underway. Instead, the question be-
comes whether or not the last attack was the final blow of the campaign;
if it was, further defensive operations are unnecessary.
Aside from the strict criteria of self-defense, there are three issues
involving self-defense that merit discussion in light of recent events. The
first is whether the law of preemptive self-defense applies to operations
against non-State actors, especially terrorists. Assuming it does, when
can a potential victim State strike into another State's territory to pre-
empt the non-State actor's attack? Finally, since States almost
universally claim that their use of force is justified by the right to self-
defense, who is competent to evaluate such claims?
2. Armed Attacks by Non-State Actors
A number of commentators have suggested that the law of self-
defense presupposes a State-on-State conflict and is therefore inapplica-
ble to terrorist acts. ° This does not mean that States cannot respond to
terrorism, but rather that the appropriateness of preventive, preemptive,
and remedial actions would be determined by the law of domestic and
international law enforcement.
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, it is clear that State practice con-
tradicts such an interpretation. The very day after the attacks, the
Security Council passed Resolution 1368, which characterized the "hor-
68. Bin Laden has been indicted for involvement in these attacks. United States v. Bin
Laden, Indictment, S(2) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 1998), http://cns.miis.edu/
pubs/reports/pdfs/binladen/indict.pdf.
69. OFFICE OF COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PAT-
TERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2000, app. B (Apr. 30, 2001), http://www.state.gov/s/ct/
rls/pgtrpl/2000/2450.htm (Al-Qa'ida).
70. See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Cate-
gories of International Law, in EUR. J. INT'L L. DISCUSSION FORUM, THE ATTACK ON THE
WORLD TRADE CENTER: LEGAL RESPONSES, at http://www.ejil.org/forum WTC/ny-
cassese.html (last modified Nov. 26, 2001); see also Giorgio Gaja, In What Sense Was There
an "Armed Attack"?, in EUR. J. INT'L L. DISCUSSION FORUM, THE ATTACK ON THE WORLD
TRADE CENTER: LEGAL RESPONSES, at http://www.ejil.org/forumWTC/ny-gaja.html (last
modified Feb. 4, 2002).
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rifying" attacks as a "threat[] to international peace and security," and
reaffirmed the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in
accordance with the Charter [of the United Nations]."7' Just over two
weeks later, the Council again cited the right to self-defense in Resolu-
tion 1373.72 It must be recalled that at the time, especially on September
12, no one was seriously suggesting that the attacks had been the work
of any State, or even an agent of a State. On the contrary, attention
quickly zeroed in on transnational terrorists, especially the al-Qa'ida
organization. Thus, from the very beginning, the Security Council acted
as if article 51 applied to attacks by terrorists.
So did States. For instance, NATO, which depends on the consensus
of nineteen nations when taking action, invoked article V, the collective
self-defense provision of the North Atlantic Treaty.73 Absent was any ref-
erence against whom the self-defense might be directed. Since the U.S.-
U.K. (two NATO countries) air strikes against al-Qa'ida began a mere
five days later, NATO obviously viewed the self-defense exception to the
prohibition on the use of force as applicable to terrorists.
Other organizations and States followed suit. The Organization of
American States invoked the Rio Treaty's collective self-defense provi-
sions,74 while Australia similarly offered to deploy troops in accordance
71. S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 48, pmbl.
72. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., pmbl., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1373 (2001). Contrary to the approach taken by the Security Council, the General
Assembly did not refer to self-defense in its resolution on the attacks. G.A. Res. 56/1, U.N.
GAOR, 56th Sess., Agenda Item 8, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/I (2001).
73. Article V, based on article 51 of the U.N. Charter, provides for collective self-
defense if any of the Member States suffers an "armed attack."
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or
North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently
they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right
of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of
the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith,
individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary,
including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North
Atlantic area.
North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, T.I.A.S. No. 1964, at 4, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246. On
September 12, NATO's North Atlantic Council stated that the attacks would be "regarded as
an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty" if they originated from outside the
United States. Press Release (2001)124, Statement by the North Atlantic Council, North At-
lantic Treaty Organization (Sept. 12, 2001), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/
pr/2001/pOl-124e.htm. After the United States provided "clear and compelling" evidence that
the attacks were not the work of domestic terrorists, the North Atlantic Council invoked article
V. Statement by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, NATO Headquarters (Oct. 2,
2001), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/200l/s0l 1002a.htm.
74. Terrorist Threat to the Americas, Res. 1, 24th Meeting of Consultation of Ministers
of Foreign Affairs Acting as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, OEA/Ser.F/II.24, RC.24/RES.I/01 (Sept. 21, 2001). The
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with the ANZUS Treaty.75 Bilateral offers of support to the United States
flowed in from around the globe. 6
That the 9/I1 attacks were nearly universally viewed as implicating
the right to self-defense became abundantly clear following the com-
mencement of the campaign against al-Qa'ida and the Taliban on
October 7. One week after the attacks began, the Security Council
passed Resolution 1378, which accepted the strikes against al-Qa'ida by
expressing support for "international efforts to root out terrorism, in
keeping with the Charter of the United Nations," and implicitly adopted
self-defense as the legal basis for the strikes when it reaffirmed Resolu-
tions 1368 and 1373 (which had cited the right to self-defense)."
In terms of State practice, the United Kingdom conducted the first
strikes alongside U.S. forces; other countries, including Georgia, Oman,
Pakistan, the Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkey, and
Uzbekistan, provided critical airspace and facilities. China, Egypt, and
Russia publicly expressed approval of the strikes," while Australia, Can-
treaty provides that "[t]he High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any State
against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States and,
consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the
attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized
by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations." Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal As-
sistance, Sept. 2, 1947, art. 3, para 1, 62 Stat. 1681, 1700, 21 U.N.T.S. 77, 95.
75. Prime Minister John Howard, Government Invokes ANZUS Treaty-Prime Minis-
ter's Press Conference (Sept. 14, 2001), available at http://australianpolitics.com.au/
foreign/anzus/01-09-14anzus-invoked.shtml; see also White House, Fact Sheet, Operation
Enduring Freedom Overview (Oct. I, 2001) [hereinafter Fact Sheet], available at
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2001/5194.htm. Article VI of the ANZUS Treaty provides:
"Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be
dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dan-
ger in accordance with its constitutional processes." Security Treaty Between Australia, New
Zealand, and the United States, Sept. 1, 1951, art. IV, 3 U.S.T. 3420, 3423, 131 U.N.T.S. 83, 86.
76. Russia, China, and India agreed to share intelligence. Japan and South Korea of-
fered logistics support. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia broke off diplomatic
relations with the Taliban, and Pakistan agreed to cooperate fully with the United States.
Twenty-seven nations granted overflight and landing rights, and forty-six multilateral declara-
tions of support were obtained. Fact Sheet, supra note 75.
77. S.C. Res. 1378, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4415th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1378
(2001). Later resolutions expressed support for the anti-terrorist operations, even as combat
operations in Afghanistan were ongoing. This strengthens arguments for applicability of the
law of self-defense to situations involving terrorism. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1386, U.N. SCOR,
4443d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1386 (2001); S.C. Res. 1390, supra note 42. Specific reference
was made to Osama bin Laden and the al-Qa'ida network in the January resolution.
78. Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of "Armed Attack" in Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter, 43 HARv. INT'L L.J. 4.1,49 (2002); Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of
the United States Relating to International Law, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 237, 248 (2002) [hereinaf-
ter Murphy, Contemporary Practice]. The Organization for the Islamic Conference simply
urged the United States to limit the campaign to Afghanistan, while the Asia-Pacific Economic




ada, the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Turkey, and the United Kingdom offered ground troops.7 9 As
the war progressed, many States offered further support, ranging from
Kyrgyz airfields, to Spanish, Dutch, Danish, and Norwegian transport
aircraft, to a South Korean medical team. 0
It is incontrovertible that States now treat the law of self-defense as
applicable to acts by non-State actors. This interpretation appears consis-
tent with the plain text of the U.N. Charter. Although the prohibition on
the use of force in article 2(4) expressly applies to States, article 51
makes no mention of who must commit the armed attack that activates
the right to self-defense. By negative implication then, the right applies
regardless of the source of the armed attack; had article 51 been intended
to be limited to States, it would have so stated, as was done in arti-
cle 2(4). This makes sense in light of the fact that violent acts committed
by non-State actors are already universally criminalized in domestic and
international penal law; prohibition within the Charter framework would
have been duplicative. However, as the events of 9/11 tragically demon-
strated, domestic or international law enforcement may prove an
insufficient tool in effectively defending against non-State actors, such as
terrorists.
Of course, not every attack, whether by a State or a non-State actor,
implicates the international law right of self-defense, and the derivative
right to preempt that attack. Indeed, the International Court of Justice, in
the Nicaragua case, held that not all uses of force amounted to an
"armed attack" justifying the use of force in self-defense. Rather, the act
has to be of a particular "scale and effects."8' The Court specifically ex-
cluded mere frontier incidents from the ambit of the phrase.
79. Murphy, Contemporary Practice, supra note 78, at 248. The European Council
"confirm[ed] its staunchest support for the military operations ... which are legitimate under
the terms of the United Nations Charter and of Resolution 1368." Declaration by the Heads of
State or Government of the European Union and the President of the Commission, Follow-up
to the September 11 Attacks and the Fight Against Terrorism, Ghent European Council, Oct.
19, 2002, SN 4296/2/01 Rev. 2.
80. Americans in a Strange Land, EcONOMIST, May 4, 2002, at 41.
81. Applying customary international law, the International Court of Justice held in the
Nicaragua case:
[T]he prohibition of armed attacks may apply to the sending by a State of armed
bands to the territory of another State, if such an operation, because of its scale and
effects, would have been classified as an armed attack rather than as a mere frontier
incident had it been carried out by regular armed forces. But the Court does not be-
lieve that the concept of "armed attack" includes not only acts by armed bands
where such acts occur on a significant scale but also assistance to rebels in the form
of the provision of weapons or logistical or other support. Such assistance may be
regarded as a threat or use of force, or amount to intervention in the internal or ex-
ternal affairs of other States.
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Such acts by States might amount to an international wrong, but ab-
sent an "armed attack," the State is precluded from responding with the
use of force in self-defense, as that term is understood in international
law. The same applies to terrorist acts. If the attack is of significant scale
(e.g., intended to cause multiple deaths) and conducted either by or on
behalf of a foreign State or by a transnational or foreign terrorist group
operating from abroad, then it implicates the "armed attack" phraseology
of article 51 and its customary international law counterpart. Of course,
quite apart from the international law issue, any individual who is at-
tacked may defend himself or herself, or even others, under the domestic
laws of self-defense, defense of others, or defense of property, and law
enforcement entities may use force to prevent crimes or apprehend
wrongdoers under domestic laws and regulations governing law en-
forcement. Nevertheless, such measures are not the type envisaged by
preemptive strategies.
3. Crossborder Operations
If a non-State actor can conduct an armed attack, can the potential
victim cross into another State without its consent in order to preempt
that action? This is an especially apropos question in light of the transna-
tional terrorism besetting the early twenty-first century. As with much of
international law, the answer depends on finding an appropriate balance
between seemingly contradictory rights and obligations.
All States enjoy the right of territorial integrity, a customary interna-
tional law right codified in article 2(4)'s prohibition on threats or uses of
force against the "territorial integrity ... of any State."82 At the same
time, States have a right to self-defense. Under certain circumstances,
the territorial integrity principle obviously must yield to this right. For
instance, it is manifestly legal to cross into another State to conduct mili-
tary operations in self-defense if it is that State which has committed
aggression.
Ascertaining the appropriate balance between one State's right to
territorial integrity and another's right to self-defense depends in part on
the extent to which the former has complied with its own international
obligations vis-?A-vis the latter. It is a long-established principle of inter-
national law that "a State is bound to use due diligence to prevent the
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.) (Merits), 1986
L.C.J. 14, para. 195 (June 27) (emphasis added).
82. Noncompliance with this duty may amount to an act of aggression. Aggression is
the "use of armed force by a State against the ... territorial integrity ... of another State."
Definition of Aggression, supra note 67, art. 1, at 713. Additionally, pursuant to article 3, ag-
gression includes "[tihe invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of
another State." Id. art. 3.
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commission within its dominions of criminal acts against another nation
or its people. 83 This principle is reflected in numerous pronouncements
84on terrorism. .
If a State is unable or unwilling to comply with this obligation, the
victim State may then cross into the offending State to conduct defensive
operations. Over history, there have been numerous examples of States
exercising this self-help right of self-defense, the most well known being
General John Pershing's 1916 campaign into Mexico after the bandit
Pancho Villa."5 In the recent past, such incidents include the air strikes
against terrorist facilities in Sudan and Afghanistan in response to the
1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam and
the 1999 pursuit of Hutu guerrillas in the Democratic Republic of Congo
by Ugandan forces following a massacre of foreign tourists. Of course,
83. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 88 (Sept. 7, 1927) (Moore,
J., dissenting).
84. The 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations, for example, urges States to "refrain
from ... acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commis-
sion of [terrorist acts in another State]," Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Char-
ter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 85, at
4, U.N. Doc. A/Res/2625 (1970). The proscription is echoed in the 1994 Declaration on
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism. G.A. Res. 49/60, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm.,
49th Sess., 84th plen. mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. A149/743 (1994); see also Declaration to Sup-
plement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res.
51/210, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 51st Sess., 88th plen. mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/51/631
(1996). With regard to terrorists operating from Afghanistan, note that there were numerous
Security Council resolutions condemning the Taliban's willingness to allow territory they
controlled to be used by al-Qa'ida prior to 9/11. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. SCOR, 54th
Sess., 4051st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (1999); S.C. Res. 1333, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess.,
4251st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (2000).
85. Another well-known example involved U.S. air and ground attacks into Cambodia
during the Vietnam War. For an analysis of the legal issues therein, see John H.E. Fried,
United States Military Intervention in Cambodia in the Light of International Law, in 3 THE
VIETNAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 100 (Richard Falk ed., 1972); Captain Timothy
Guiden, Defending America's Cambodian Incursion, 11 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 215
(1994); Note, International Law and Military Operations Against Insurgents in Neutral Terri-
tory, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1127 (1968).
86. On the events, see Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against
bin Laden, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 559 (1999); Leah M. Campbell, Comment, Defending Against
Terrorism: A Legal Analysis of the Decision to Strike Sudan and Afghanistan, 74 TUL. L. REV.
1067 (2000); W. Michael Reisman, International Legal Responses to Terrorism, 22 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 3, 53 (1999). Most criticism surrounding the cruise missile strike against the al-Shifa
pharmaceutical plant in Sudan (which was allegedly involved in chemical weapons produc-
tion) focused on the validity of the claimed connection between the plant and international
terrorism, not the violation of Sudanese territory; the attacks against al-Qa'ida training bases
in Afghanistan evoked little criticism. Nor did the 1999 operations in the Congo, although
internationalization of the conflict drew international concern and resulted in dispatch of a
peacekeeping force by the Security Council. In S.C. Res. 1291, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess.,
4104th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1291 (2000), the Council authorized the United Nations
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recall that the seminal Caroline case itself involved a self-help penetra-
tion of U.S. territory without the consent of the United States. And there
was virtually no criticism of the. 2001 incursions into Afghanistan to
strike at al-Qa'ida after the Taliban failed to comply with U.S. and U.N.
demands to surrender Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants.87
It cannot be otherwise, for the unwillingness or inability of one State
to meet its legal obligations cannot deprive other States of the most im-
portant right found in international law, the right to defend oneself
against an armed attack. Still, the right of the State conducting the defen-
sive operation must have matured by the time of the territorial
penetration. With respect to preemption, this requires that an attack be
imminent, that no viable alternatives to the prospective military opera-
tion exist and that the force finally used be limited to that necessary to
accomplish the defensive objectives. In such cases, the exhaustion of
remedies component of self-defense translates into a requirement that
the potential victim State issue a demand that the sanctuary State comply
with its obligation to prevent its territory from being improperly used.
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. For details and background,
see http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/monuc/monuc-body.htm.
87. The Security Council had repeatedly insisted on Taliban compliance with measures
sought by the United States. In Security Council Resolution 1333, for example, it "demanded"
that:
[T]he Taliban comply without further delay with the demand of the Security Coun-
cil in paragraph 2 of Resolution 1267 (1999) that requires the Taliban to turn over
Usama bin Laden to appropriate authorities in a country where he has been in-
dicted, or to appropriate authorities in a country where he will be returned to such a
country, or to appropriate authorities in a country where he will be arrested and ef-
fectively brought to justice; ... [and also that] the Taliban should act swiftly to
close all camps where terrorists are trained within the territory under its control....
S.C. Res. 1333, supra note 84. In June 2001, the United States warned the Taliban regime that
it would be held responsible for any terrorist acts committed by terrorists operating from its
territory. Press Release, United Kingdom, 10 Downing Street Newsroom, Responsibility for
the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States, II September 2001 (Oct. 4, 2001), para. 16,
available at http://www.number- I 0.gov.uk/news.asp?NewsId=2686. After the attacks of 9/11,
the United States continued to press its demands through the Pakistani government, which
maintained diplomatic relations with the Taliban. They were articulated publicly in late Sep-
tember during a presidential address to a joint session of Congress. Specifically, the United
States insisted that the Taliban:
Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of AI-Qa'ida who hide in your
land. Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens, you have unjustly
imprisoned. Protect foreign journalists, diplomats, and aid workers in your country.
Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan,
and hand over every terrorist and every person in their support structure to appro-
priate authorities. Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so
we can make sure they are no longer operating.
Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist
Attacks of September 11, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1347 (Sept. 20, 2001).
[Vol. 24:513
Preemptive Strategies
Once mounted, the operation must immediately be terminated and all
forces withdrawn as soon as the defensive objectives are attained. Fur-
ther, the preemptive strike may not be directed at the "sanctuary" State
itself, for it has not committed an armed attack unless it subsequently
uses force against the State conducting the defensive operations. In that
case, since the initial defensive use of force is lawful, any other State's
countervailing use of force-would amount to an "armed attack."88
There are two other circumstances in which it is indisputable that
one State's armed forces can cross into another State to conduct preemp-
tive defensive operations. Since it enjoys sovereignty, the latter may
consent to the operation. The second situation is one in which the terror-
ists in question, or other non-State actors, act on behalf of the State into
which the defensive strikes penetrate.89 When this occurs, the potential
terrorist attack may be attributed as a matter of law to the sanctuary State
such that its territorial integrity rights fade away as if it was going to
commit the attack itself. The sole question then becomes whether cross-
border operations are necessary, proportional, and in response to an
imminent armed attack.
4. Assessing Claims of Self-Defense
Dean Acheson's well-known assertion that "[t]he survival of states is
not a matter of law"9° implies that the rule of law necessarily yields to
the force of international security when the stakes are high enough. Al-
though Secretary Acheson somewhat overstates his case, it is true that
the mechanisms for assessing claims of self-defense are weak;9' hence,
88. Professor Robert Turner has offered a similar analysis. Robert F. Turner, Interna-
tional Law and the Use Of Force in Response to the World Trade Center and Pentagon
Attacks, JURIST (Oct. 8, 2001), at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew34.htm. On self-
help, see also Franz W. Paasche, The Use of Force in Combating Terrorism, 25 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 377 (1987); Guy B. Roberts, Self-Help in Combatting State-Sponsored Terror-
ism: Self Defense and Peacetime Reprisals, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 243 (1987); Oscar
Schachter, The ExtraTerritorial Use of Force Against Terrorist Bases, 11 Hous. J. INT'L L.
309 (1989).
89. On the evolution of legal standards regarding the extent of support necessary to
attribute a terrorist act to a State, see Schmitt, supra note 62.
90. Dean Acheson, Remarks by the Honorable Dean Acheson, 1963 PROC. OF AM.
Soc'Y INT'L L. 13, 14. The remarks were made in the context of the Cuban Missile Crisis
during the annual meeting of the American Society of International Law. As might be ex-
pected, prominent international lawyers, such as Myres McDougal and Quincy Wright, took
him to task. Id. at 15-18.
91. Indeed, upon becoming party to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, both the United States
and France insisted that only the State itself could determine the need for self-defense. U.S.
Note of June 23, 1928, cited in Oscar Schacter, Self-Defense and the Rule of Law, 83 AM. J.
INT'L L. 259, 260-61 (1989). Paradoxically, the Nuremberg Tribunal rejected auto-interpretation
when it held that claims of self-defense "must ultimately be subject to investigation and
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the propensity for States to cite self-defense as a rationale for nearly
every use of force not authorized by the Security Council.92
Judicial remedies are scarce. The International Court of Justice can
only exercise its contentious jurisdiction (as distinct from advisory juris-
diction) in cases between States that are party to its Statute, and even
then consent of the dispute's participants is necessary before the case
may be heard. Such consent may be granted specifically for a particular
controversy, be provided for in a treaty to which the disputants are both
party, or be expressed in a declaration that the State recognizes the
Court's jurisdiction as compulsory ipso facto with respect to any other
State accepting the same obligation.93
The final method, compulsory jurisdiction under the "optional
clause," was at the heart of the Nicaragua case, which involved a U.S.
claim that it was acting in collective self-defense with El Salvador by
supporting insurgent activities in Nicaragua. Having executed an op-
tional clause declaration in 1946, the United States sought to amend it in
1984 vis-A-vis Central American States in order to avoid the Court's ju-
risdiction. When the International Court of Justice rejected the U.S.
attempt and proceeded to rule on the merits, the United States withdrew
from the litigation. 94 In other cases, respondents have failed to appear
altogether.95 But even when the Court does deliver a binding decision in a
contentious case, the sole formal enforcement mechanism is the Security
Council.96 Of course, any possible action it might take may be vetoed by
one of the permanent members of the Council, as was done by the
United States when Nicaragua sought enforcement of the Court's deci-
sion in Nicaragua.9'
No other existing international tribunal has jurisdiction over wrong-
ful uses of force based on claims of self-defense. Eventually, the
International Criminal Court (ICC) may have jurisdiction over individu-
adjudication if international law is ever to be enforced." I TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMI-
NALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 208 (1947).
92. For example, the Soviet Union justified its invasion of Afghanistan on the basis of
self-defense, a claim rejected by the General Assembly. See G.A. Res. ES-6/2, U.N. GAOR, 6th
Emergency Special Sess., Agenda Item 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-6/2 (1980).
93. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 36, 59 Stat. 1055,
T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1179. See SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE WORLD COURT, ch. 5 (5th rev. ed.
1995), for a discussion of the legal and practical aspects of the Court's jurisdiction.
94. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.)
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility), 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Nov. 26).
95. E.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3 (July 25); Nuclear Tests
(Austl. v. Fr.; N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20); United States Diplomatic and Consular
Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24).
96. U.N. CHARTER art. 94, para. 2.
97. Excerpts From Verbatim Records Discussing I.C.J. Judgment in Nicaragua v.
United States, 25 I.L.M. 1352, 1364 (1986).
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als charged with the crime of aggression. However, aggression still needs
to be defined in an amendment to the Statute, which will also have to set
out the conditions under which the ICC shall exercise jurisdiction over
the crime.98
The primary structural remedy for abusive claims of preemptive self-
defense is, thus, resort to the Security Council. There is little doubt that a
use of force which violated the legal requirements of self-defense would
be a breach of the peace and/or act of aggression, thereby empowering
the Security Council to act to restore or maintain international peace and
security pursuant to Chapter VII. Indeed, the right of self-defense under
article 51 is itself subject to the condition that it may only be exercised
"until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security."99
Of course, ultimately, if a State wrongfully claims to be acting in
self-defense against another State, the "victim" State may respond in
self-defense to the armed attack that it is suffering, either individually or
collectively. In fact, this remedy is certainly the most meaningful one
available.
III. PREEMPTIVE STRATEGIES-FINAL THOUGHTS
The Cuban Missile Crisis, in which President John Kennedy ordered
a naval quarantine in response to Soviet installation of medium range
nuclear missile systems in Cuba, is often cited as the precedent for the
new U.S. preemptive strategy. However, in 1962 the United States spe-
cifically chose not to base its legal justification on the law of self-
defense. As Abram Chayes, the Department of State's Legal Advisor at
the time, has explained,
I think the central difficulty with the Article 51 argument was
that it seemed to trivialize the whole effort at legal justification.
No doubt the phrase "armed attack" must be construed broadly
enough to permit some anticipatory response. But it is a very
different matter to expand it to include threatening deployments
or demonstrations that do not have imminent attack as their pur-
pose or probable outcome. To accept that reading is to make the
occasion for forceful response essentially a question for unilat-
eral national decision that would not only be formally
98. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the U.N. Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on 17
July 1998, art. 5, para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 999, 1004.
99. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. No situation has occurred to date in which the right to self-
defense was supplanted by Security Council action.
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unreviewable, but not subject to intelligent criticism, either ....
Whenever a nation believed that interests, which in the heat and
pressure of a crisis it is prepared to characterize as vital, were
threatened, its use of force in response would become permissi-
ble.
... In this sense, I believe an Article 51 defense would have sig-
nalled that the United States did not take the legal issues
involved very seriously, that in its view the situation was to be
governed by national discretion, not international law.'°°
Similarly, when Israel bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, it
claimed that Iraq was in a state of war with Israel (having fought Iraq
three times-1948, 1967, 1973), asserted that Iraq denied the right of
Israel to exist as a State and averred that one purpose of the Iraqi nuclear
program was to attack Israel. Therefore, "in removing this terrible nu-
clear threat to its existence, Israel was only exercising its legitimate right
of self-defence within the meaning of this term in international law and
as preserved also under the United Nations Charter."' In response to this
self-defense justification, the Security Council unanimously "con-
demn[ed] the military attack by Israel in clear violation of the Charter of
the United Nations and the norms of international conduct."'
02
The world has changed and international law must evolve to remain
relevant. A restrictive reading of self-defense made sense in a bipolar
State-centric world where the risk of superpower involvement, or even
nuclear exchange, served deterrent ends. But as correctly noted in the
2002 National Security Strategy, those most likely to threaten interna-
tional peace and security today may be undeterrable. Moreover, the
consequences of failure to meet these threats, in light of both their strat-
egy of targeting the civilian population and the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, could be catastrophic. Ultimately, law must be con-
strued in the context in which it is to be applied if it is to remain
relevant; and in the twenty-first century security environment, insistence
on a pass6 restrictive application of international legal principles to
strategies of preemption would quickly impel States at risk to ignore
them.
100. ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 65-66 (1974); see also Myres S.
McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 Am. J. INT'L L. 597 (1963);
W.T. Mallison, Jr., Limited Naval Blockade or Quarantine-Interdiction: National and Collec-
tive Defense Claims Valid Under International Law, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 335 (1962).
101. Excerpts from Security Council Provisional Verbatim Record of June 15, 1981, 20
I.L.M. 996 (1981).
102. S.C. Res. 487, U.N. SCOR, 35th Sess., 2288th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.2288 (1981).
[Vol. 24:513
Preemptive Strategies
The approach set forth above represents an evolution, not revolution,
in the two Charter exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force. It
provides a basis for allowing the Security Council to authorize preemp-
tive action in response to any situation that might threaten international
peace and security. The Charter requirements that such a mandate be
approved by nine of the Council's fifteen members and that none of the
five permanent members cast a veto serve as effective safeguards against
abuse of power by the Council.
Aside from Security Council action, individual States, operating in-
dividually or collectively, may act preemptively in self-defense.
However, because there is no structural mechanism to prevent abuse of
the right, States do not enjoy the freedom of action that the Council
does. On the contrary, the right is strictly limited. In particular, there
must be near certainty that an armed attack will be launched, peaceful
alternatives to resolution of the situation must be exhausted beyond rea-
sonable doubt, defensive action can only be taken during the last
available window of opportunity, and the defensive force used cannot
exceed that necessary to deter the threat. The defensive operations may
be conducted against non-State actors, who can no longer count on the
legal principle of territorial inviolability to allow them sanctuary in sym-
pathetic or weak States.
And the future? The continued spread of weapons of mass destruc-
tion and transnational terrorism will likely continue to exert pressure on
the existing normative boundaries. This trend is already in evidence. For
instance, the attack directly against the Taliban on October 7, 2001 chal-
lenged then-existing legal understandings of the quality and quantity of
support necessary to attribute an armed attack by a non-State actor to its
State sponsor. Yet, there was virtually no condemnation of the U.S. and
U.K. strikes because the international community deemed them sensible
in the context of 9/11. A year later, State sponsors are on notice that al-
though the precise level of support necessary to legally justify defensive
operations against State sponsors of terrorism remains unclear, it surely
has dropped. Of course, al-Qa'ida was conducting an ongoing campaign
of terror against the United States, a fact that made acceptance of the
response against the Taliban more palatable. Nevertheless, the commu-
nity reaction to the situation signals a willingness to tolerate aggressive
responses to the new threats that may well be reflected in the realm of
preemptive activities.
This is certainly the case with regard to Iraq. Opposition to the strike
against the country has far less to do with whether such a strike can be
conducted in the first place than with concern that various legal precon-
ditions have not been met. For instance, almost no one argues that the
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Security Council would have been unable to authorize strikes against
Iraq for its noncompliance with resolutions demanding cooperation with
weapons inspections. Indeed, as noted earlier, the dialogue assumed the
Council could do exactly that-hence the discussion over whether a fol-
low-up resolution was necessary before strikes could be launched.
Similarly, assertions that the United States could act preemptively in
self-defense were met with claims that alternatives, such as resort to the
Security Council, had not been exhausted (necessity), that an assault
which resulted in regime change was more than necessary to force Iraq
into compliance with the inspections regime (proportionality), and that
Iraq was years from developing a nuclear weapons capability and
unlikely to employ chemical or biological weapons unless attacked (im-
minency). In other words, the controversy centers on whether the
situation was ripe for a U.S. military preemptive operation, not the legal-
ity of such an operation in the abstract.
Ultimately, the question regarding evolution of any legal standard is
whether its development contributes to a furtherance of world order. In
the current environment, with images of the suffering wrought by trans-
national terrorism still fresh and growing awareness of the very real
danger that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction poses, the trend
would appear positive. However, in law as in life, one must be careful
what one wishes for. There are enormous risks associated with preemp-
tive strategies, for each preemptive act builds a body of State practice
that can be relied upon by those who would "claim" the right malevo-
lently.' 3 Thus, it is incumbent on responsible States to pull the
preemptive trigger only after every requisite legal condition has been
met. Acting precipitously or without due regard to existing norms will
almost certainly erode the international legal system that is so central to
world order. That reality would favor no State.
103. President Chirac of France has expressed just this concern.
As soon as one nation claims the right to take preventive action, other countries will
naturally do the same .... What would you say in the entirely hypothetical event
that China wanted to take pre-emptive action against Taiwan, saying that Taiwan
was a threat to it? How would the Americans, the Europeans and others react? Or
what if India decided to take preventive action against Pakistan, or vice versa?
Comments of Jacques Chirac, quoted in Elaine Sciolino, French Leader Offers Formula to
Tackle Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2002, at Al.
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